Making Sex the Same: Ending the Unfair Treatment of Males in Family Law by Lewis, Myrisha S.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2012
Making Sex the Same: Ending the Unfair
Treatment of Males in Family Law
Myrisha S. Lewis
William & Mary Law School, mslewis01@wm.edu
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Lewis, Myrisha S., "Making Sex the Same: Ending the Unfair Treatment of Males in Family Law" (2012). Faculty Publications. 1919.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1919
 257 
MAKING SEX THE SAME: ENDING THE UNFAIR 
TREATMENT OF MALES IN FAMILY LAW 
Myrisha S. Lewis 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 258 
I. ARTICLE MODEL .......................................................................................... 260 
II. PRE-FERTILIZATION “FREE” MARKET VERSUS POST-FERTILIZATION 
STRICT LIABILITY ................................................................................ 261 
III. CHILD SUPPORT OVERVIEW ...................................................................... 263 
IV.THREE SITUATIONS IN WHICH MALES ARE TREATED UNFAIRLY IN 
FAMILY LAW AS EVIDENCED BY INCONSISTENT IMPOSITION OF 
CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY ................................................................... 268 
A. Contraceptive Fraud ..................................................................... 268 
B.   Sexual Assault ............................................................................ 269 
C.   Statutory Rape ............................................................................ 269 
V.POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNFAIR TREATMENT OF MALE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, CONTRACEPTIVE FRAUD, AND STATUTORY RAPE 
VICTIMS ............................................................................................... 271 
A. Compensation to Male Victims for the Use of their Biological 
Material ........................................................................................ 272 
B. A Revision of Child Support Guidelines that Result in 
Reduction or Elimination of Child Support Liability................... 273 
i. Child Support Reduction or Elimination when Male 
Parentage is a Result of Contraceptive Fraud ........................ 273 
ii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male 
Parentage is a Result of Sexual Assault ................................. 275 
iii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male 
Parentage is a Result of Statutory Rape ................................. 275 
C. “Just Cause” Exception for Statutory Rape Victims .................... 278 
D.  A Model Statute Combining the Latter Two Solutions............... 279 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 280 
 
                                                        
 The views represented in this article are solely my own and do not represent those of any 
employer. I would like to thank Carol Sanger and Calicia Lewis for their help on my article 
throughout the process.  Any mistakes are solely my own. 
258 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY [Vol. 27:3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As a matter of practice, many seemingly gender-neutral laws addressing 
the transmission of sexually transmitted disease, assisted reproduction,1 and 
child support treat males unfairly. These laws impose parental obligations on 
males who have been forced into parenthood (through contraceptive fraud,2 
sexual assault, or statutory rape), in spite of Supreme Court decisions, which 
emphasize the values of privacy and autonomy in sexual relations and the 
decision whether to reproduce.3 These same values of privacy and autonomy 
form the basis for state courts’ decisions not to interfere with personal relations 
by aiding male victims of contraceptive fraud, who are victims of a sexual 
partner’s “misrepresentation. . .[of] . . .sterility or use of some form of birth 
control.”4 By imposing child support obligations on male sexual assault and 
male statutory rape victims, courts disregard the complete absence of autonomy 
involved in these males’ reproduction, as they never had the opportunity to 
decide whether to reproduce. On the other hand, when a person is infected by a 
sexually transmitted disease courts are willing to provide compensation to a 
victim who unwillingly acquires the disease, even though both male 
contraceptive fraud victims and individuals who have contracted sexually 
transmitted diseases often failed to take the same precaution.5 In sum, privacy 
                                                        
1.  What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012) (“[Assisted reproductive 
technology] includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled. In 
general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman’s ovaries, 
combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman’s body [as 
embryos] or donating them to another woman. They do NOT include treatments in which 
only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine—or artificial—insemination) or procedures in 
which a woman takes medicine only to stimulate egg production without the intention of 
having eggs retrieved.”). 
2.  Sally Sheldon, ‘Sperm Bandits’, Birth Control Fraud and the Battle of the Sexes, 21 
LEGAL STUD. 460, 463 (2001). Contraceptive fraud, which will be explored in detail in the 
article, is also referred to as “birth control fraud” or “sperm banditry.”  See id. at 460-80. 
3.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972). 
4.  Sheldon, supra note 2, at 463. 
5.  See Matthew Seth Sarelson, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of the Negligent 
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 12 GEO. MASON LAW REV. 481, 
508 (2003) (discussing the difference in legal treatment of sexually transmitted disease 
transmission and unwanted pregnancy: “You cannot sue for ‘wrongful birth’ but you can sue 
for disease transmission; this is so even though the underlying facts constituting the 
wrongful birth or disease transmission are often identical. For example, in California, a 
father cannot sue the mother of his unwanted child on the grounds that she lied when she 
claimed to be using birth control pills. However, a man is liable if he negligently, or 
intentionally for that matter, fails to disclose he has genital herpes. In both cases one partner 
lied to the other, apparently in an effort to ‘reassure’ the partner that the sex would be ‘safe.’ 
Both plaintiffs were harmed—an unwanted child, an unwanted disease. Why the 
distinction?”); see also infra note 51. 
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and autonomy give way to public health concerns when a disease is 
transmitted, but courts yield to these same concepts when rejecting male 
contraceptive fraud claims and the claims of male sexual assault and statutory 
rape victims. 
This article conducts a detailed exploration of the legal environment 
where male contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims are 
punished with child support liability, even though they are victims of deception 
or actual crimes. After addressing the consequences of sex or artificial 
insemination, with the exception of embryo disposition upon divorce and the 
complexities of the marital presumption in family law, this article offers three 
solutions to the mistreatment of males in family law: 
1) A statute that compensates male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual 
assault, and statutory rape for the use of their sperm, as if they had 
been sperm donors; 
2) A revision of child support guidelines that results in a reduction or 
elimination of child support liability for victims of contraceptive 
fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape; 
3) A “just cause” exception for child support in cases of male statutory 
rape, contraceptive fraud, and sexual assault victims. 
If implemented, these solutions would result in a legal environment where 
male contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims are not 
punished with child support liability, but instead receive compensation for the 
unauthorized use of their biological products. 
These proposed statutory provisions also address the market-based and 
financial inconsistencies that occur as a result of state court decisions by 
creating compensatory regimes for victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual 
assault, and statutory rape. After fertilization,6 the legal treatment of sperm and 
eggs shifts them from commodities to liabilities.7  Eggs and sperm are worth 
money at the time they leave the host and before conception, but after they 
enter another’s body, these market-based concerns are no longer the primary 
consideration.8  Thus, the biological market effectively ends upon fertilization. 
                                                        
6.  Fertilization is the successful entrance of a sperm into an egg, resulting in an 
embryo and ultimately, a child; see How Your Baby Grows During Pregnancy, AMERICAN 
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq156.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120907T18032822
20 (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).   
7.  See Claudia Dreifus, A Conversation with Debora Spar: An Economist Examines 
the Business of Fertility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/28/health/28conv.html?pagewanted=all, for more 
information on the market for human eggs and sperm; see also Peggy Orenstein, In Vitro We 
Trust, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20wwln-
lede-t.html. When sex results in the birth of a child, the parents are both liable for the support 
of the child, while anonymous sperm donors are generally absolved of liability. See 
generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity 
Law and Paternal Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2004). 
8.  See Dreifus, supra note 7. 
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After conception, even males who have become “involuntary sperm donors” 
through contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or statutory rape, are not 
compensated for their bodies’ products and are punished with legal liability, 
mainly through the imposition of child support.9 By harmonizing the legal 
treatment of sexual relations with that of assisted reproductive technology, the 
monetary aspects of sex,10 and compensation for the donation of sperm and 
eggs, these related concepts will share a common legal foundation and resultant 
treatment. 
I. ARTICLE MODEL 
The integral parts of reproduction are allotted a monetary value in the 
fertility market and are a source of income for donors before fertilization 
occurs. Yet, after a woman is pregnant with a fertilized egg, the male who 
provided the fertilizing sperm, either voluntarily or through fraud or assault, 
may be monetarily liable through the imposition of child support obligations. 
The word “may” is used in the preceding sentence because anonymous sperm 
donors who participate in assisted reproductive technology11 escape child 
support liability, while male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or 
statutory rape are legally required to support the child that results from the use 
of their sperm.12 This is particularly shocking in light of state courts’ statements 
implying a right to avoid procreation.13 Thus, this article examines how the 
                                                        
9.  The term “involuntary sperm ‘donors’” here refers to men who are victims of 
contraceptive fraud. Even though these men would be compensated for the use of their 
sperm had they donated it at a sperm bank, they are punished with child support liability for 
the use of their sperm through sex. The parallel term of “involuntary sperm ‘donor’” was 
used because later in this article, I will discuss the case of S.F. v. ex rel. T.M, in which a 
female had sex with an unconscious man and later told him that it “saved her a trip to the 
sperm bank.” See discussion infra  pp. 18, 22-23; see also Laura W. Morgan, Child Support 
Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365, 371-2 (2008) (“The courts have even gone so far as to 
hold a biological father liable for child support when he was the victim of sexual assault”). 
10.  Some examples include child support and compensation for the transmission of 
disease 
11.  Assisted reproductive technology is generally the “[surgical] remov[al] of eggs 
from a woman’s ovaries, [the] combin[ation of] them with sperm in the laboratory, and [the 
subsequent] return[. . . of] them to the woman’s body [as embryos] or donat[ion of] them to 
another woman.” What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012). While the CDC does 
not use the term to apply to “treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine—
or artificial—insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to 
stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved,” in this article, the 
term will refer to intrauterine or artificial insemination. Id.  
12.  See discussion infra Part IV: Three Situations in which Males are Treated Unfairly 
in Family Law as Evidenced by Inconsistent Imposition of Child Support Liability.  
13.  See Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable 
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 
308 (2008) (“[C]ourts generally have concluded that the right to avoid procreation outweighs 
the right to biological parenthood.”); see also Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 
1998 WL 886561, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“Our own Tennessee Supreme 
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results of sex or reproduction are treated differently depending on the location 
of the biological product within the “reproductive spheres” established below.14  
In some ways, this model operates as a family law “balance sheet” and shows 
the situations where sperm can be an asset and where it can be a liability. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
By analyzing the legal treatment of sex, the model statutes discussed later 
attempt to harmonize the law and, therefore, eliminate these variant spheres. 
II. PRE-FERTILIZATION “FREE” MARKET VERSUS POST-FERTILIZATION STRICT 
LIABILITY 
The fertility industry offers assisted reproductive technology, including 
sperm and eggs for purchase, for individuals facing difficulty in conceiving a 
child. Anonymous sperm donation is often an important aspect of assisted 
reproductive technology.15 Artificial insemination statutes vary from state to 
                                                                                                                                
Court has stated, “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal 
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.” (quoting Davis v. 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.1992))). 
14.  See infra Figure 1. 
15.  See Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/#16 (last updated Apr. 19, 2012), for a 
general overview of assisted reproductive technology. See, for example, Jacqueline Mroz, 
One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all; William Heisel, 
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state.16 These statutes establish the lack of parental rights and obligations for 
egg and sperm donors and, combined with the marital presumption, identify 
when husbands are deemed to be fathers of the children conceived through 
artificial insemination.17 
As of 2008, the fertility industry is a $3 billion-per-year sector of the 
medical economy.18 In addition, the fertility industry is characterized as a “self-
regulated” industry.19 There are federal regulations, but they are limited: 
“[f]ederal [regulations of] the health of donated tissue. . .requir[e] that donors 
undergo certain tests for diseases like AIDS. . .[which] does not otherwise 
regulate the process in any significant way. It does not preclude the sale of 
eggs, sperm, or embryos.”20 State regulations of the fertility industry also exist 
but are often not very restrictive beyond testing requirements for diseases.21 
Now, sperm and eggs are available from donors who are compensated at 
rates that range from $60-75 for sperm donation22 (and up to $100 for men with 
graduate degrees)23 to $8,000 for egg donors from university hospitals24 and 
                                                                                                                                
Registry May Track Egg, Sperm Donors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/03/local/me-eggs3, for news accounts 
16.  See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *4 (N.Y.S. Jan. 18, 1991). 
17.  Laura W.W. v. Peter W.W., 51 A.D.3d 211, 217 (N.Y.S. 2008) (“Consistent with 
our State’s strong presumption of legitimacy, as well as the compelling public policy of 
protecting children conceived via AID, we follow the lead of other jurisdictions that impose 
a rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of a woman who conceives by AID, 
shifting the burden to the husband to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing 
evidence.” (citing In re Baby Doe, 291 SC at 391, 353 SE2d at 878; K. S. v G. S., 182 NJ 
Super 102, 109, 440 A2d 64, 68 [1981]; People v Sorensen, 68 Cal 2d 280, 283, 437 P2d 
495, 497 [1968]; but see Jackson v Jackson, 137 Ohio App 3d 782, 795, 739 NE2d 1203, 
1213 [2000] [burden on wife to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence])). 
18.  See Dreifus, supra note 7; Orenstein, supra note 7. Another source states that 
fertility is a $3 billion to $4 billion per year business. NAOMI L. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: 
WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 1 (2009); see generally DEBORA L. 
SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF 
CONCEPTION, 40-41 (2006). 
19.  Orenstein, supra note 7. 
20.  CAHN, supra note 18, at 18-19. 
21.  See Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation 
Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GEN. LAW & POL’Y 379, 384 (2009) (discussing state 
regulation of sperm donation); see also Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and 
Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 NW. J. 
L. & SOC. POL’Y 167 (2008) (discussing state regulation of egg donation). 
22.  See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (2003) (stating that sperm donors are compensated $60 per donation); see also 
SPAR, supra note 18, at 39 (“[Donors] contribute a fixed number of times over a relatively 
short period and receive around $75 per specimen”). 
23.  Jennifer Anyaegbunam, Ivy League Women Get Offers for Their Eggs, CNN 
HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2009), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2009/08/12/ivy-league-women-get-
offers-for-their-eggs/. 
24.  Egg Donation: Compensation, CORNELL UNIV. JOAN & SANFORD I. WEILL MED. 
COLL. http://www.eggdonorcornell.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); Becoming an Egg 
Donor, NYU LANGONE MED. CTR., http://www.nyueggdonor.org/egg-donor-compensation 
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even up to $100,000 for the eggs of well-educated women.25 Vials of sperm sell 
to prospective parents for $250 to $400 each, and eggs generally sell for 
$4,500.26 However, family law only compensates males for the use of their 
biological products if their sperm successfully fertilizes an egg under 
conditions created in a physician’s office, not in the private arena. 
III. CHILD SUPPORT OVERVIEW 
Family law’s inconsistent treatment of certain males manifests mainly 
through the unfair imposition of child support obligations. Child support is “a 
parent’s legal obligation to contribute to the economic maintenance and 
education of a child until the age of majority, the child’s emancipation before 
reaching majority, or the child’s completion of secondary education. The 
obligation is enforceable both civilly and criminally.”27 In the present legal 
environment, if a male and female engage in sex that results in a child, 
regardless of the voluntariness or legality of the sexual intercourse, both parties 
are responsible for the child’s support.28 Every state has a child support 
program, for which the state receives assistance from the federal government in 
enforcement.29 Furthermore, parents cannot bargain away child support through 
private contract because it belongs to the child, even though state law allows 
“anonymous” egg and sperm donors to do exactly that.30 Of course, anonymous 
sperm donors are not truly anonymous, as sperm banks keep track of the sperm 
donation source, and some sperm banks even allow women to pick donors 
based on the donors’ characteristics.31 These men provided their sperm 
voluntarily, received compensation for it, and have no parental rights or 
obligations, while the victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or 
statutory rape provided their sperm involuntarily.  It is worth noting that legal 
parentage does not only result in obligatory monetary outlays but also involves 
parental rights. While many males do not want child support liability, many 
females also do not want additional persons with parental rights or obligations 
                                                                                                                                
(last visited Apr. 23, 2011) (“You will receive $8,000 to compensate for your time, effort 
and inconvenience, which is paid in full by NYU School of Medicine.”). 
25.  Anyaegbunam, supra note 23. 
26.  SPAR, supra note 18, at 39. The typical cost of sperm is $300 and the typical cost 
of eggs is $4,500.  Id. at 213.   
27.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (8th ed. 2004).   
28.  Ellen London,  A Critique of the Strict Liability Standard for Determining Child 
Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault and Rape, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1957, 
1958 (2004). 
29.  See State and Tribal Child Support Agency Contacts, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/extinf.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
30.  See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); 
Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see also Michael H. 
v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (demonstrating minimization of children’s rights). 
31.  One sperm bank that allows this donor selection is the California Cryobank. See 
Selecting a Sperm Bank, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Why-Use-
Us/Selecting-a-Sperm-Bank/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).   
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involved in their or their children’s lives.32 Thus, the historical basis for child 
support—the nuclear family—is no longer a reality or a desired ideal for many 
parents.33 
The constitutional foundation of state judicial analysis of reproduction and 
sexually transmitted disease transmission is the right to privacy. The basis of 
this right, which is often referred to as procreational autonomy,34 stems from 
landmark Supreme Court decisions that focus on personal autonomy in the 
reproductive sphere.35 These decisions about reproduction and procreational 
autonomy should operate to equalize males and females, but their focus on 
female autonomy renders the general themes of individualism and autonomy 
for all persons, including men, unnoticed. 
While state court decisions, Supreme Court decisions, and commentators 
often emphasize the rights of privacy and autonomy as constitutional rights, 
“[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy. . .[however, since 1891] the Court has recognized that a right of 
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist 
                                                        
32.  Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 486 (127 Cal. App. 4th 2005) 
(“Our Legislature has already spoken and has afforded to unmarried women a statutory right 
to bear children by artificial insemination (as well as a right of men to donate semen) without 
fear of a paternity claim, through provision of the semen to a licensed physician.” [ . . . ] The 
Legislature “has likewise provided men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to 
married and unmarried women alike without fear of liability for child support. Subdivision 
(b) states only one limitation on its application: the semen must be ‘provided to a licensed 
physician.’”). 
33.  See, e.g., Diana B. Elliott, How Nuclear is the Nuclear Family?: Extended Family 
Investments in Children  (2008) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation) available at 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8753/1/umi-umd-5772.pdf  (“Our understanding of 
what a family is emerges from the Ozzie and Harriet era of the 1950s, but does not reflect 
the multiplicity of family forms in the United States today (Stacey 1996). As Judith Stacey 
(1996) eloquently writes, ‘The family is indeed dead, if what we mean by it is the modern 
family system in which units comprised of male breadwinner and female homemaker, 
married couples, and their offspring dominate the land. But its ghost, the ideology of the 
family, survives to haunt the consciousness of all those who refuse to confront it,” (p. 49).”). 
See James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, 132 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 4 
(1990), available at http://www.bls.gov/mlr/1990/03/art1full.pdf, for additional information 
on the nuclear family. 
34.  See Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v. 
Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 150 (2008) (“Because a father has a right not to procreate, and 
because a declaration of legal paternity can cause emotional harm that burdens a father’s 
ability to define himself and his procreational realm, a declaration of legal paternity may 
violate the father’s right to procreational autonomy.”), for more information on procreational 
autonomy. See Sorrel, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212 at *3 (“Our own Tennessee Supreme 
Court has stated, ‘the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal 
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.’ (quoting Davis v. 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.1992))), for a discussion of procreational autonomy in a state 
court case addressing contraceptive fraud. 
35.  See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), 
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under the Constitution.”36 One of these zones of privacy is the sphere of 
reproduction.37 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court “conclude[d in Roe] 
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this 
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests 
in regulation.”38 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court also protected the 
right of privacy in the reproductive context. The Supreme Court reasoned that 
“[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”39 This reasoning has inspired state courts to identify a “right to 
procreational autonomy”,40 which is a re-characterization of the right to privacy 
identified in Roe v. Wade and Eisenstaedt v. Baird. The right to procreational 
autonomy has been mentioned in several state courts’ decisions. For example, a 
Tennessee court deciding whether a contraceptive fraud victim should be liable 
for child support noted that “[o]ur own Tennessee Supreme Court has stated, 
‘the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal 
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.’”41 
Yet, just as the right to abortion is subject to the limitations of state 
interests in regulation, the right to procreational autonomy is also subject to 
limitations. For example, courts note that a male’s right to avoid procreation is 
not infringed upon by contraceptive fraud.42 Decisions state that male victims 
of contraceptive fraud still could have used contraception43 in order to combat 
                                                        
36.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 176. 
37.  See id. at 152 (noting the many spheres of life that privacy entails).  
38.  Id. at 154. 
39.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
40.  See Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (example of state court identification of procreational autonomy); 
see, e.g., Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procreational Autonomy Through the Utilization of 
Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals an 
Indefinite Solution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2008).  
41. Sorrel, 1998 WL 886561, at *2 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn.1992)). 
42.  See, e.g., L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983); Sorrel, 1998 WL 
886561 at *3 (“Other related cases from other jurisdictions have generally dealt with 
instances wherein either the mother misrepresented to the putative father that she was 
practicing birth control, or the putative father offered to pay for an abortion. Each such case, 
however, supports the conclusion that paternity actions do not deprive a putative father of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to procreational autonomy simply because he did not “consent” 
to childbirth” (citing Beard v. Skipper, 182 Mich.App. 352, 451 N.W.2d 614, 615 
(Mich.App.1990) (quoting L. Pamela P. and holding, ‘We see no reason why Michigan 
should decide this issue differently’); Faske v. Bonanno, 137 Mich.App. 202, 357 N.W.2d 
860, 861 (Mich.App.1984); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash.App. 288, 687 P.2d 223, 228 
(Wash.App.1984) (citing L. Pamela P. and holding that the constitutionally protected right 
of privacy does not ‘encompass the right of one parent to avoid a child support obligation 
where the other parent’s choice regarding procreation is not fully respected’) Erwin L.D. v. 
Myla Jean L., 41 Ark.App. 16, 847 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ark.App.1993))).   
43.  Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
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one of the “natural results of consensual sexual intercourse”–childbirth.44 These 
decisions further state that a “respondent’s constitutional entitlement to avoid 
procreation does not encompass a right to avoid a child support obligation 
simply because another private person has not fully respected his desires in this 
regard.”45 In this way, courts are recognizing that both males and females have 
the right to use contraception, as guaranteed to all married or single persons, 46 
but if a person decides to not use contraception due to the representations of his 
or her sexual partner, state courts decided that this does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. 
Courts permit successful legal actions against partners who transmit 
sexually transmitted diseases, but not against partners who engage in the same 
act of unprotected sex to dupe someone into becoming a parent against his 
will.47 In Stephen K. v. Roni L., a contraceptive fraud cause of action, the 
California Court of Appeal “conclude[d]  that as a matter of public policy the 
practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a consensual 
sexual relationship is best left to the individuals involved, free from any 
governmental interference.”48 This public policy characterization parallels the 
language of the aforementioned Supreme Court decision, Eistenstadt v. Baird,49 
which held that married and unmarried persons had the same right to 
contraception under the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution 
because the right to privacy freed individuals from governmental interference 
into matters such as “the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”50 
Contraception enables the individual to control, to a certain extent, 
whether a sexual relationship will result in a child. Condoms, one form of 
commonly used contraception, aid in preventing the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases.51 If individuals can decide whether to bear or beget a child 
through contraceptives, and diseases are transmitted and prevented in the same 
manner as children, then disease transmission and unwanted parenthood should 
not be treated in a legally different manner; causes of action for both should be 
                                                        
44.  Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
45.  L. Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 713, 716. In this case, a contraceptive fraud victim 
argued that the “deliberate misrepresentation of the mother concerning her use of 
contraception” served as a defense to his child support obligation. Id. at 714. The Court of 
Appeals of New York rejected this argument. Id. 
46.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972) 
47.  Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 892 
(2005).  
48.  Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621. 
49.  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
50.  Id. (“We need not, and do not, however, decide that important question in this 
case, because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the 
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”). 
51.  See Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 111 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2011); Wallis 
v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 
1186, 1188 (Ala. 1997), for examples of cases in which no condoms were used. 
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successful.52 Instead, decisions state that male victims of contraceptive fraud 
still could have used contraception in order to prevent conception.53 
It is incongruous to support a “public policy” that opposes the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases but simultaneously asserts that 
“as a matter of public policy the practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by 
two partners in a consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals 
involved, free from any governmental interference.”54 Both sexually 
transmitted diseases and pregnancy are risks of sex, so both of these results 
should be actionable. In some ways, courts have selected the cause of action 
that has less need of protection. Even though awards for the transmission of 
sexually transmitted diseases include compensatory damages,55 the medications 
for sexually transmitted disease treatment are generally covered by insurance or 
available at low-cost providers, such as Planned Parenthood.56 On the other 
hand, there is no aid available for child support payments; child support is an 
individual undertaking, excluding the provision of governmental support for the 
economically disadvantaged.57  Today’s social context where the nuclear family 
is disappearing renders this suggested “obligation” weaker. 
An example that highlights the financial disparity between the legal 
treatment of sexually transmitted disease transmission and childbirth is a 
California judgment for the transmission of herpes. Recently, a defendant was 
ordered by the California Court of Appeal to pay his sexual partner $72,000 in 
future prescription medication expenses, $1,575,600 in compensatory damages 
for the negligent transmission of genital herpes,58 and $2.75 million in punitive 
                                                        
52.  See Matthew Seth Sarelson, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of the Negligent 
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 481, 509 
(2003); see also Oberman, supra note 47, at 892. 
53.  Wallis, 22 P.3d at 685; see also Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621. 
54.  Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 378 (1983) (quoting Stephen K. v. 
Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d. 640, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).  
55.  See, e.g. Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 111 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2011); 
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979) (summarizing tortious actions in other 
states for the transmission of diseases). 
56.  See Health Info & Services, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
http://plannedparenthood.org/health-center/ (last visited July 25, 2012)  (stating that local 
Planned Parenthood health centers provide STD testing, treatment, and vaccines); see, e.g., 
Richmond Health Center – Richmond, VA, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ (enter “Richmond Health Center” in “site search” bar, 
select first result). 
57. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between 
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 620 (2009) (“The Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program requires states to seek to establish the paternity of 
children born to unmarried mothers for purposes of imposing child support obligations on 
the men. If states do not meet federally-mandated paternity establishment goals, they will 
lose TANF funds, and states with paternity establishment rates above 50% receive incentive 
payments that increase as the rate increases.“). 
58.  Behr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 113, 116. 
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damages.59 Thus, it can cost a defendant over $3 million to infect a sexual 
partner with a disease and nothing to convert a male into an involuntary parent 
even though the “cost of raising a child from birth to age 18 for a middle-
income, two-parent family averaged $226,920 last year (not including college), 
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.”60 
IV. THREE SITUATIONS IN WHICH MALES ARE TREATED UNFAIRLY IN FAMILY 
LAW AS EVIDENCED BY INCONSISTENT IMPOSITION OF CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY 
A. Contraceptive Fraud 
Contraceptive fraud, the least legally successful claim of those analyzed in 
this article, is the first situation meriting a reduction or elimination of child 
support obligations.  A major reason for the rejection of contraceptive fraud 
claims is that courts view these contraceptive fraud claims as attempts to reduce 
or “[adjust] a natural parent’s obligation to pay child support.”61 Admittedly, 
enacting a law reducing or eliminating child support obligations for male 
victims of sexual assault, statutory rape, and contraceptive fraud would create 
an opportunity for males to use the law as a means of avoiding child support 
obligations. This opportunity would be most attractive to men who had 
unprotected sex without any deception because they would be able to more 
easily argue for contraceptive fraud. There would be resultant evidentiary 
difficulties if such a law existed; every “man could claim that his partner led 
him to believe that she was taking oral contraceptives and therefore breached 
her duty to disclose that she was not using contraception.”62 Yet, the law limits 
its own application because it is generally difficult to find evidence of 
contraceptive fraud in a sexual relationship.63 The only evidence would likely 
be a “confession” from a female. This is indeed possible because there has been 
a recorded case of a woman who has admitted that she defrauded the 
contraceptive fraud victim.64 A contraceptive fraud statute could encourage 
more males who have been defrauded to pursue legal remedies. Even if a 
partner’s declarations about birth control cannot be proven, when female 
                                                        
59.  Id. at 115. 
60.  Jessica Dickler, The Rising Cost of Raising a Child, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/pf/cost_raising_child/index.htm.  
61.  Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). 
62.  Oberman, supra note 47, at 918. 
63.  See Bryn Ann Poland, He Said, She Said: Diverging Views in the Emerging Field 
of Father’s Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 173 (2006) (“The intimate nature of the act 
usually provides no witnesses or other tangible evidence to prove whether a 
misrepresentation was made or, if it was, whether the other party relied on it when engaging 
in sexual conduct. Moreover, recognition of tort principles would potentially create an 
incentive for abortion.”). 
64.   Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“Sorrell admits that she did not inform Henson about stopping the birth 
control pills, and the parties did not engage in any alternative form of birth control.”). 
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defendants admit that they were taking birth control and then stopped, courts 
should rule in favor of contraceptive fraud victims.65 Thus, although a statute 
that would reduce or eliminate child support liability for contraceptive fraud 
victims appears extreme, its applicability would be very limited. 
 B.  Sexual Assault 
A second situation meriting an elimination or reduction in child support is 
the sexual assault of a man that results in a pregnancy and subsequent 
childbirth. An example of male sexual assault resulting in parental obligations 
is S.F. v. ex rel. T.M., an Alabama case in which a woman had non-consensual 
sex with an intoxicated, unconscious man several times, resulting in her 
pregnancy and the birth of a child.66 This male victim, who was unconscious at 
the time of conception, was held liable for child support.67 The sexual assault of 
an intoxicated, unconscious woman would undoubtedly immediately result in 
an outcry for justice. Such a woman would face less scrutiny for not wanting to 
take care of a child that would result from such an assault, if the child were 
ever born.68 
In this sphere of female sympathy, S.F., the male rape victim, 
unsuccessfully pled to the courts for equitable treatment.  S.F “contended that 
the court, acting in equity, could abate any child support payments due because 
of what he alleged to be T.M.’s sexual assault upon him.”69 This claim was 
rejected and illustrates why a statute is necessary to equitably abate child 
support and reduce the reliance upon judicial independence. 
 C.  Statutory Rape 
The third situation with unfair child support obligations is statutory rape. 
As underage victims70 cannot legally consent to sex, the logical result should be 
that male statutory rape victims cannot unwillingly become legal parents with 
child support obligations.71 Instead, the opposite occurs and statutory rapes 
serve as a predicate for civil liability in the form of child support payments.72 
                                                        
65.  Id. 
66.  S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. 1997). 
67.  Id. at 1187, 1190. 
68.  Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of 
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from their Victimization?, 36 GA. 
L. REV. 411, 412 (2002) (“Specifically, statutory rape laws are being enforced according to 
cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men as sexual aggressors.”). 
69.  S.F., 695 So. 2d. at 1187. 
70.  I use the word “victims” to place an emphasis on unwilling males as it is clear that 
underage persons can be parents as evidenced by young pregnant women.  Yet, these women 
have some control over the imposition of biological and legal parenthood through the 
previously discussed right to abortion. 
71.  E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of 
the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 116 (2006) (“The theory behind statutory rape is that a minor cannot 
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Other commentators have noticed that gender-based stereotypes influence 
the enforcement of statutory rape laws: “[s]pecifically, statutory rape laws are 
enforced according to cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men 
as sexual aggressors.”73 The inexistence of judicial decisions that eliminate 
child support obligations for male statutory rape victims also reveals that such 
stereotypes exist; this is evidenced by the reasoning used in state court 
decisions.74 This cultural stereotype may account for the reluctance of courts to 
distinguish the claims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape 
victims from those who voluntarily fathered a child and simply do not want to 
pay. Courts’ and state legislatures’ failure to differentiate between all males 
and victimized males enforces gender inequity in society. 
These aforementioned cultural stereotypes reduce sympathy for male 
victims and lead to judicial decisions that include statements such as: “[t]he law 
should not except Nathaniel J. from this responsibility because he is not an 
innocent victim [emphasis added] of Jones’s criminal acts. After discussing the 
matter, he and Jones decided [emphasis added] to have sexual intercourse. 
They had sexual intercourse approximately five times over a two week 
period.”75 
The family court judge here mischaracterized the situation, as evidenced 
by the judicial decision’s word choice. Most notably, the court states that this 
child, Nathaniel J., “decided” to have sex with a thirty-four-year-old woman, 
even though the law does not recognize Nathaniel J.’s ability to make the 
decision.76 Even if the judge thinks that Nathaniel J. “decided” to consent to 
this crime which was committed on him, this is an individual, independent 
determination that should not be recognized by the judicial system. 
Additionally, had Nathaniel J. been a female victim of statutory rape, it is 
doubtful that a court would decide that he was not an “innocent victim” or 
mention his role in his own victimization. 
When assessing the claims of male statutory rape victims, state courts 
forget that Justice Blackmun’s observation in Roe v. Wade could apply to male 
statutory rape victims too: “Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon 
the woman a distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be 
                                                                                                                                
legally consent to sex because of [his or] her young age. Among the important purposes of 
statutory rape laws is the prevention of teenage pregnancy.”). 
72.  See generally infra Part V.B.iii. 
73.  Jones, supra note 68, at 412; see also London, supra note 28, at 1974, 1975 
(“Ruth Jones explains that statutory rape laws were drafted—and are enforced—in light of 
the female experience. . .Jones analyzes the failings of the strict liability in the context of 
equality, primarily arguing that ‘while young men and young women are dissimilar in their 
ability to become pregnant, they are similar in their need for protection by statutory rape 
laws.’”). 
74.  See e.g., Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th 843, 844 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 843-45. For more information on statutory rape, see infra Part V.B.iii.  
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imminent.”77 Paternity, or additional offspring, may force a distressful life and 
future upon the male statutory rape victim. Beyond the obvious financial and 
emotional burden of raising a child at any age, “[p]sychologically, [child] 
fathers are [especially] not necessarily ready to take a step toward 
parenthood.”78 By absolving male statutory rape victims of child support 
obligations, the legal system acts to prevent further victimization of the child. 
Moreover, the assumption that a reduction in the father’s support 
obligation directly correlates to a reduction in the child’s support, which is also 
addressed in contraceptive fraud cases, arises in the statutory rape context.  In 
determining that a statutory rape victim was liable for child support, the Court 
of Appeals of Wisconsin wrote, “[e]ven assuming that L.H. criminally 
assaulted [the] appellant, child support is paid to benefit the child, not the 
custodial parent.  The custodial parent receives support payments in trust to be 
used for the child’s welfare.”79  The decision to focus on the second, newborn 
child as opposed to the victimized child is arbitrary and contrary to protection 
of victims of statutory rape.  If voluntary anonymous donors are statutorily 
absolved of child support liability, then victims of statutory rape should also be 
statutorily absolved of child support liability. 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNFAIR TREATMENT OF MALE SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, CONTRACEPTIVE FRAUD, AND STATUTORY RAPE VICTIMS 
Current child support guidelines need to be revised or judicial exceptions 
to the guidelines recognized, in order to end the unfair treatment of male 
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims. This belief is 
founded on a disagreement with state court views of child support.  As an 
initial matter, there are certain cases in which a natural parent should not be 
“obligated” to pay child support due to a criminal matter (sexual assault, 
statutory rape) or contraceptive fraud. Furthermore, anonymous donors are 
“natural parents” who, if an “obligation” were justified, should be subject to the 
same obligations as a natural parent who was involuntarily such a parent. 
However, state law often absolves these “natural parents” of any obligation to 
pay child support even though they willingly parented a child. 
                                                        
77.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
78.  Annie Devault, Young Fathers Research Cluster Executive Summary: Father 
Involvement Community Research Forum Spring 2006, FATHER’S INVOLVEMENT RESEARCH 
ALLIANCE, http://fira.ca/cms/documents/50/Young_Fathers.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
79.  J.J.G. v. L.H.,149 Wis. 2d 349, 352, 441 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Wis. App. 1989) 
(citing Francken v. State, 190 Wis. 424, 441, 209 N.W. 766, 772 (1926)); see Jevning v. 
Chicos, 499 N.W. 515, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).  Some cases hold the opposite.  See 
Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (1982) (upholding a woman’s recovery for 
an abortion:”[w]hile it is true that the alternative methods of birth control which the claimant 
would have used had she not relied upon the defendant’s misrepresentation are not one 
hundred percent effective, these methods are far superior to sexual intercourse without the 
use of any contraception. Therefore the remote chance the pregnancy might have resulted in 
any event is not sufficient to deny the claimant recovery.”). 
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 A.Compensation to Male Victims for the Use of their Biological Material 
As noted in Figure 1 and the introductory discussion of the fertility 
industry, sperm is an asset, at least when offered to a commercial entity 
offering reproductive assistance. Anecdotally, the sexual assault context offers 
the clearest example of why male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, 
and statutory rape should, at least, be compensated for the nonconsensual use of 
their sperm, by revealing some of the reasoning involved in these situations 
preceding liability. In S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., the case introduced in section 
IV, a friend of the male victim who 
testified that approximately two months later he had had a 
conversation with T.M. in which she told him that she had had sex 
with S.F. while he was passed out and that it had ‘saved her a trip to 
the sperm bank.’  S.F. presented testimony from two other witnesses 
who testified that they had heard T.M. brag about having sex with 
S.F. while he was passed out.80 
It is clear from the testimony that S.F., the male sexual assault victim, did 
not consent to the sex that “saved [T.M.] a trip to the sperm bank.”81 Building 
upon this example, as an initial matter, S.F. is entitled to a compensatory outlay 
of money which would range between (a) the amount of money that he would 
have received at the sperm bank for the donation and (b) the market price in his 
area for a vial of sperm. I created a model statute to compensate these victims 
not only inspired by fairness, but also because the property-based concept of 
conversion is not available for a tort claim.82 A statutory embodiment of this 
compensatory concept, as follows, would be very simple when added to the 
civil code of a state: 
§1.  Compensation for the unauthorized use of biological products 
a. Men whose semen is obtained through misrepresentations of 
sterility or the use of birth control, through statutory rape, or 
through sexual assault are entitled to compensation for the use of 
their biological products. 
b. This compensation will be the highest of either 
                                                        
       80. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. 1996). 
81.  Id. 
82.  Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (“Wallis sued Smith for 
money damages, asserting four causes of action-fraud, breach of contract, conversion, and 
prima facie tort-that the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.”); Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“The conversion claim likewise fails for lack of proof of 
any agreement regarding the disposal of the semen.”); see also Phillips v. Irons, No. 05 L 
4910, 2006 WL 4472185 (Ill. Cir. Apr. 18 2006) (“[The plaintiff] alleged that the Defendant 
obtained sperm from the Plaintiff via oral sex and had herself inseminated with the Plaintiffs 
sperm.”).   
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i. the amount of money that the male would have received 
for his sperm at a local donation center; or 
ii. the market price in his geographic location for a vial of 
sperm. 
B. A Revision of Child Support Guidelines that Result in Reduction or 
Elimination of Child Support Liability 
While courts are willing to punish men for crimes like statutory rape 
without hesitation, courts and prosecutors are much more reluctant to punish 
women for the same crimes.83 For example, “a biological father who fails to 
pay child support to his child’s mother faces the possibility of incarceration, 
which is perhaps the ultimate deprivation of liberty.”84 Holding women 
financially liable for their crimes that result in childbirth, through the 
imposition of additional child support liability, equalizes the treatment of males 
and females, especially since courts are not sentencing these women to time in 
prison.85 The imposition of financial liability on women, the historical victim in 
family law, recognizes that both males and females play important roles in the 
abandonment of children, and that men are no longer the only aggressors as 
previously thought. 
i. Child Support Reduction or Elimination when Male Parentage is a Result of 
Contraceptive Fraud 
A reduction or elimination of the amount of child support that a non-
custodial parent should pay is an appropriate response to an act that should be a 
crime and is an action that does not reduce the support of the child. First, the 
“best interests of the child” standard, a family law standard which underlies 
                                                        
83.  See Jones, supra note 68, at 112 (“Specifically, statutory rape laws are being 
enforced according to cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men as sexual 
aggressors.”); see also id. at 433 (“By enacting gender-neutral statutory rape laws, legislators 
have ensured that both men and women can be prosecuted for committing the offense of 
statutory rape. However, although an increasing number of women have been prosecuted for 
statutory rape, there are continuing allegations that women are not treated the same as male 
offenders. Specifically, there are allegations that authorities fail to perceive the sexual 
relationship between an adult woman and a male adolescent as statutory rape, that women 
are not prosecuted as often as men, and that women do not receive similar sentences. For 
example, the Ventura County District Attorney’s web page, which describes statutory rape as 
a gender-neutral crime, only discusses enforcement against men and gives the purpose of 
enforcement as prevention of teenage pregnancy.”). 
84.  Bruno, supra note 34, at 159. 
85.  See, e.g., S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189 (“We find S. F.’s argument to be without merit. 
The child is an innocent party, and it is the child’s interests and welfare that we look to under 
the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act. The purpose of this act is to provide for the general 
welfare of the child; any wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the 
father’s duty to provide support for the child. We note that the father could have filed 
criminal charges against the mother.” [emphasis added] (citing § 13A-6-65, Ala. Code 
1975.)). 
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child support provisions, is not reduced by the reallocation of child support 
income.86 Practically, courts conflate the child’s best interests with the 
mother’s, by assuming that if a male is no longer parentally responsible, then 
the child will not receive half of his or her support;87 this is not the case. As 
child support is an income-based calculation, not a reimbursement calculation 
that ensures the allocation of fifty percent of a child’s actual expenses to each 
parent, courts’ characterization of the removal of male support as a loss to the 
child is not practical.88 Instead of apportioning the child’s actual expenses 
between the two parents in an equal manner, the courts should view child 
support as a mechanism for ensuring that the best interests of the child are 
addressed, while also realizing that a re-apportionment of responsibility would 
mean that women responsible for contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, or sexual 
assault would use more of their actual income to provide for the child. Because 
child support is not a fixed allocation of money for each child, regardless of 
economic situation, but rather a percentage-based allocation, a parent who 
disregards the procreative autonomy of another could use more of their income 
                                                        
86.  See generally Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests 
of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. AND FAM. STUD. 337 (2008) 
(regarding the “best interests of the child” standard). 
87.  This conclusion stems from state court refusals to reduce or mitigate the child 
support obligations of male contraceptive fraud victims.  See e.g. Wallis, 22 P.3d at 684 
(“Placing a duty of support on each parent has the added benefit of insulating the state from 
the possibility of bearing the financial burden for a child. In our view, it is difficult to 
harmonize the legislative concern for the child, reflected in the immutable duty of parental 
support, with Wallis’s effort in this lawsuit to shift financial responsibility for his child 
solely to the mother.”); see also Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983) (“The only 
issues which are to be considered in a support action continue to be the needs of the child 
and the means of  both parents Indeed, the possibility of fabricated accusations, the less than 
certain effectiveness of birth control methods, and the fact that claims like appellant’s, if 
successful, could result in the denial of support to innocent children whom the Support Law 
was designed to protect, all illustrate that allegations of a mother’s failure to use birth control 
have absolutely no place in a proceeding to determine child support.” (citing Conway v. 
Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974))); Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 
618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“We are in effect asked to attach tortious liability to the 
natural results of consensual sexual intercourse. Stephen’s claim is one of an alleged wrong 
to him personally and alone. Procedurally and technically it is separate and apart from any 
issue of either parent’s obligation to raise and support the child.”); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 
462 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 ( Ct. App. N.Y. 1983) (“We agree with the Appellate Division that 
the mother’s alleged deceit has no bearing upon a father’s obligation to support his child or 
upon the manner in which the parents’ respective support obligations are determined. The 
order of the Appellate Division should therefore be affirmed.”). 
88.  Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. 
L. REV. 649, 673 (2002); see Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1985) (“to allow one parent to utilize a plenary action to deflect the statutory obligation 
onto the other would render [. . .the statute] nugatory”); see also Hughes, 455 A.2d at 625  
(“claims like appellant’s [a contraceptive fraud victim’s], if successful, could result in the 
denial of support to innocent children whom the Support Law [child support statute] was 
designed to protect.”). 
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to support the child than the law would usually prescribe.89 For example, 
instead of seventeen percent of the father’s income going to the child’s 
custodial parent for the child’s care (as required by New York’s child support 
guidelines),90 a revised statute (as will be presented in Subsection D of this 
Section, entitled “A Model Statute Combining the Latter Two Solutions”), 
would change the guidelines so that the standard parental percentage 
contribution would be reduced in exceptional cases, such as those involving 
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape. Similarly, a court order 
or statute could reduce the amount of the father’s income going to the child 
with the “loss” of support funding being composed of the mother’s income.91  
Thus, child support statutes would now include an additional provision 
allowing for the reduction of the usual percentage contribution from the father. 
ii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male Parentage is a Result of 
Sexual Assault 
A criminal mother should not be able to “profit” from sexual assault and 
the theft of a male’s sperm through child support payments from her victim, 
which have the impact of reducing the burden on the mother of providing for 
the child. Even though the child support payments are for the child, the mother 
benefits from child support because she has to use less of her income to support 
the child.  Instead, the burden of raising a child, one which she undertook 
herself, is one for which she should be solely responsible. Thus, the percentage 
of the non-custodial parent’s contribution should be reduced, or eliminated, and 
the criminal mother should use more of her disposable income to support the 
child. 
iii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male Parentage is a Result 
of Statutory Rape 
Treating statutory rape victims in the same manner as anonymous donors 
in artificial insemination statutes ends the second-guessing of criminal law by 
family court judges. A statutory rape victim did not intend to create a child and, 
under criminal law, could not consent to the act that resulted in the birth of the 
child; as a result, he should not be liable for resultant child support outlays 
from an illegal act.92 
                                                        
89.  See, e.g., Child Support Guidelines, THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.: ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE TRIAL COURT (Jan. 1, 2009), available at  
http://www.mass.gov/courts/childsupport/guidelines.pdf. 
90.  See Child Support Services, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/child_support_services.html#supportEstab (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
91.  Id. 
92.  See generally Jones, supra note 68, at 412; see e.g. County of San Luis Obispo v. 
Nathaniel J., 50 Cal.App.4th 842 (Cal.Ct.App. 1996). 
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Statutory rape victims should not be forced to participate in a system of 
transfers from victims to various levels of government. While some women 
who decide to birth a child are financially well-off, women whose income is 
below a certain financial threshold are eligible to receive aid through 
governmental welfare programs to support them.93 These governmental welfare 
programs have additional components which impose additional burdens on 
crime victims and imply tacit support for the further victimization of statutory 
rape victims.94 Nathaniel J., already a victim of a crime, was sued by the San 
Luis Obispo County District Attorney’s office for child support and for welfare 
reimbursement.95 This reimbursement would benefit the county, not Nathaniel 
J.’s biological child whose financial support had already been provided by the 
state. The state should not seek reimbursement from someone that its laws were 
supposed to protect. Nathaniel J.’s attorney made a similar argument by 
asserting that “exacting child support from a victim of statutory rape violates 
public policy.”96 This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal.97 
In effect, the county’s message is that Nathaniel J. is indeed a victim, but 
his needs do not supersede the state’s financial health or the mandated support 
guidelines benefitting the child he involuntarily, both factually and legally, 
created.98 At the same time, the county revealed a quasi-sympathy with 
                                                        
93.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 68, at 412-5, 449-50. 
94.  See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and 
the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 368-9 (2000) (“In 
an attempt to enforce child support, PRWORA [“the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF).”[citation 
omitted]] requires that mothers who seek public assistance cooperate in establishing 
paternity and child support. This is often referred to as the “cooperation requirement.” In 
other words, a mother who seeks public assistance is required to supply information about 
the father and appear at interviews, hearings, and legal proceedings to establish paternity. 
Furthermore, both mother and child must submit to genetic testing ordered by a court or an 
administrative agency. Failure to cooperate means a reduction in family benefits by at least 
25%. In Wisconsin, failure to cooperate results in a complete loss of cash assistance. An 
exception to child support enforcement exists when the mother has “good cause” for not 
seeking child support.”). 
95.  Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 844. 
96.  Id. at 844. Nathaniel J. also argued that a California constitutional provision 
providing that “all 
persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution 
from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer” applied to him, but this 
argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in favor of California child support law. Id. 
97.  Id.  
98.  Some courts focus their analysis on the rights of the newborn child to bring an 
action. See, e.g., Linda D. and Baby Boy D.-C v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 227 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“The UPA, however, gives the child the right to bring an action for back 
support, and requires that the child be made a party to the paternity and child support action 
when instituted by the natural mother.” (citing Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 609, 
648 P.2d 508 (1982))). However, this does not ruin my argument because children are still 
not allowed to institute these actions against their anonymous sperm donor fathers. 
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Nathaniel J.’s position by deliberately not seeking enforcement of the child 
support order until Nathaniel J. was an adult.99 The county’s position is quasi-
sympathetic because Nathaniel J. is not absolved of the child support 
obligations that accrue during his childhood but is instead being given a grace 
period, which he only obtained through litigation.100 Otherwise, Nathaniel J. 
would likely be forced to be a biological father, student, and minimum-wage 
employee with all of his money going to support a child not much younger than 
him. Or, perhaps Nathaniel J.’s parents would have had to pay the support 
obligation on his behalf, which would add additional actors to this system of 
transfers. 
My model statute completely eliminates liability for children like 
Nathaniel J. because even a reprieve on child support liability until the age of 
majority is not particularly helpful; the U.S. Census Bureau in 1999 estimated 
that the annual earnings of a worker with only a high school degree are 
$25,900.101 This calculation was completed before the 2007-08 recession, 
which rendered it even more difficult for college-educated adults to obtain 
jobs.102 It is also commonly known that young parents often feel compelled to 
take care of their children instead of pursuing higher education. Therefore, 
Nathaniel J.’s future earning capacity may be impacted by his present child 
support obligations. 
Outside of California, other states hold statutory rape victims liable for 
child support. In Minnesota, a female statutory rapist sued the child victim and 
won, forcing the statutory rape victim to pay child support.103 In Kansas, a 
lower court required a statutory rape victim to reimburse the Department of 
Social and Rehabilitation Services $7,000, but in an enforcement pattern 
similar to that of the California government, the Kansas Social and 
Rehabilitation Services (now the Department for Children and Families)104 
actively planned to never collect the $7,000 award.105 The state of Kansas, like 
                                                        
99.  Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 846 (“[O]ur office is seeking to establish 
paternity.  We are not seeking a child support order. . .until such time as the minor becomes 
an adult and is able to pay support.”). 
100.  Id.  
101. Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational 
Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (July 
2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. 
102.  See Alan B. Krueger, The Job Market for College Graduates, ECONOMIX (Dec. 8, 
2008), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/the-job-market-for-college-
graduates/.  
103.  Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W. 2d 515, 515 (Minn. App. 1993). 
104.  KANSAS DEPARTMENT FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).  
105.  State ex. Rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1280 (“When questioned in 
oral argument about the policy of SRS in seeking a judgment in excess of $7,000, counsel 
replied with the surprising statement that SRS had no intention of ever attempting to collect 
its judgment.  Under these circumstances, the reason for seeking that portion of the judgment 
still eludes us.”). 
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other states, successfully contended that the child father’s age is unrelated to 
the question of biological fatherhood. If the purpose of statutory rape laws is to 
protect children from being exploited by adults, then there is a serious flaw in 
the application of these laws. 
 C.“Just Cause” Exception for Statutory Rape Victims 
Adding a “just cause” exception to state law would be another way that 
child support obligations could be eliminated for male victims.  This is the least 
drastic of the solutions in this paper because it focuses on child victims.  A 
Delaware case where a female incest victim was excused from child support 
liability highlights an alternative, equitable method of excusing statutory rape 
victims from child support liability. In DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., the 
Delaware Family Court analyzed the Delaware code, which included a 
provision stating “[n]o person shall be required to support another while he has 
just cause for failing or refusing to do so.”106 The Delaware Family Court held 
that rape or incest qualified as “just cause.”107  A “just cause” exception would 
be less drastic than providing a blanket exception for all contraceptive fraud, 
sexual assault, and statutory rape. The addition of a “just cause” exception 
gives state courts specific authority to impose principles of equity.108 
The Delaware Family Court qualified the “just cause” exception with an 
inquiry into the voluntariness of the sexual intercourse that formed the basis for 
statutory rape. After distinguishing the DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L. case from 
other states’ cases involving male statutory rape victims, the court stated the 
following rule: 
To the contrary, in each of the cases, the respective court appeared to 
infer from the factual assertions that the sexual intercourse was 
voluntary. Where voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then 
for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. A parent’s 
duty to support the child flows directly from his voluntary 
parenthood.109 
                                                        
106.  DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., No. 38812., 1994 WL 811732, at *2-3 (Del. Fam. 
Ct. 1994). See also Jones, supra note 68, at 417-18 (discussing DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary 
L.). 
107.  DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3. 
108. Jones, supra note 68, at 447 (“Most child support laws have a general exemption 
that permits courts to exclude some parents from child support obligations in the interest of 
justice. However, given the difficulty in actually recovering support for children, courts have 
been extremely reluctant to excuse parents from their child support obligations. Typically, 
states have only permitted an exception for child support enforcement in circumstances 
where the parent lacks the ability to pay or when pursuit of support could endanger the 
mother, such as when the mother has been the victim of forcible rape or domestic 
violence.”). 
109.  DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3; see also State ex re. Hermesmann v. 
Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Kan. 1993). 
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As a result, the case was remanded in order to determine whether actual 
consent, not legal consent, was present.110 This is a procedural step that 
undermines statutory rape laws, which do not allow for consent by underage 
individuals, which would create an additional inconsistency in family law; as 
such, I would not include such a provision as an accompaniment to the “just 
cause” exception.  Adding a “just cause” exception to the law in states where 
judges do not undertake such autonomous inquiries into the merits of a victim’s 
case, however, could allow some victims to escape the unfortunate imposition 
of child support liability. 
 D. A Model Statute Combining the Latter Two Solutions 
 This model statute adds language to an existing state statute. I included 
the original statute here and added the suggested changes based on this paper’s 
findings. The original statute is in normal font, and the edits are italicized.111 
. . . §1 (a) The anonymous donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the 
donor’s wife shall be treated in law as if he were not the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived. 112 
(b) If a male child is deemed to be the victim of statutory rape, he 
shall be treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child 
conceived.  If a male is the victim of a sexual assault, he shall be 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child 
conceived.  If a male has failed to use contraception due to the 
misrepresentations of his sexual partner, then he shall be treated in 
law as if he were not the natural father of a child conceived. 
The alternative to the last sentence of §1(b) addressing contraceptive fraud 
is a provision that reduces, not eliminates, the child support liability of male: 
If a male has failed to use contraception due to the 
misrepresentations of his sexual partner, then his statutory child 
support liability shall be half of the current child support allocation. 
Therefore, a statute reducing child support liability or absolving male 
contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, and sexual assault victims of child support 
liability would parallel the current statutory language for anonymous sperm 
donation.  Additionally, addressing all four situations (anonymous sperm 
donation, statutory rape, contraceptive fraud, and sexual assault) in the same 
statute enables the public to see why these four situations should be treated 
similarly. 
                                                        
110.  DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3. 
111.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (2010). 
112.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has analyzed three possible legal methods of compensating 
male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape: 
compensation for the use of biological products, reduction or elimination of 
child support liability, and a “just cause exception”.  Admittedly, these male 
victims differ in terms of victimization from a societal perspective. That 
difference matters because even judges, who should be impartial, make 
determinations about the innocence of males in a situation that would spark an 
outrage if women were the victims. Because of the stereotype of women as 
victims and males as aggressors, in a hypothetical implementation timeline, it is 
most likely that a “just cause” provision would be first introduced and followed 
by a simple compensatory statute based on the value of biological products, as 
these are the most conservative suggestions of the article. Unfortunately, this 
“just cause” exception is also the easiest for a court to ignore. 
Men who are victims of birth control fraud,113 statutory rape, or sexual 
assault should not be liable for child support and should instead be treated like 
anonymous donors under artificial insemination statutes who receive 
compensation for their biological products as a part of a $3 billion per year 
industry.114  Granted, the economic aspects of reproduction are not novel. For 
example, when the world was dominated by agricultural economies, children 
were regarded as an additional labor source. Now, the fertility industry and 
state governments profit from a person’s desire to be a parent, and through 
reimbursements from statutory rape victims to the state and tax revenues from 
the largely unregulated fertility industry. Inserting compensatory and 
reallocation provisions into family law only recognizes the contemporary 
realities of the fertility market’s impact on the community.  The treatment of 
male contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, and sexual assault victims as 
anonymous donors reduces the prevalence of gender-based stereotypes in law, 
prevents unhindered civil court dismissal of criminal law, prevents the state 
from tacitly sanctioning fraud in parentage, and ends a system of transfers from 
the victims whose laws the state aimed to protect to state and local 
governmental bodies. 
 
                                                        
113.  “Birth control fraud” is also called “contraceptive fraud.” See Sheldon, supra 
note 2, at 460–80; see also Phillips v. Irons, No. 05 L 4910, 2006 WL 4472185 (Ill. Cir. Apr. 
18, 2006); Adrienne D. Gross, A Man’s Right to Choose: Searching for Remedies in the 
Face of Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1046 (2007) (discussing Phillips v. 
Irons: “His claims for fraud and conversion of the sperm were dismissed, but the case was 
remanded on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress that Phillips alleged 
Irons’s actions had caused him.”). 
114.  See Dreifus, supra note 7; Orenstein, supra note 7; see also CAHN, supra note 18, 
at 1; see generally SPAR, supra note 18.  
